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Abstract:
As contemporary feminist discourse continues to utilize online and digital media and
technologies as platforms and tools for debate and information sharing, the reality of who -
a n d what - has access and makes contributions to this discourse is changing. The
perception of online and digital communication and debate as accessible, intersectional
and democratizing forces has also meant that the conceived relationship between
theoretical discourse and feminist praxis in a global forum has been made more mutable,
and the distinctions between what is theory and what is praxis have become more blurred.
Whether we regard digital media as trans or post-human, disembodied or decentralized, it
does at least represent a form of conversation that blurs the boundaries of how we
communicate, who (and what) is considered to have subjectivity, the impact of
geographical location and embodiment and corporeality. These have also underpinned
feminist animal rights and feminist vegetarian/vegan discourse, especially around our
feminist understanding of what it means to be human. This paper references feminist-
vegetarian, feminist-vegan and ecofeminist theory alongside theoretical work from animal
studies across a range of disciplines to analyze feminist intersections with animal rights
and veganism. In doing this I hope to offer an introduction to how online context influences
feminist animal rights discourse. By considering this topic through a lens of ecofeminist
and vegetarian/vegan feminist theory, what we think about when we think about ‘the
animal’, and an examination of the role and function of digital media in feminist discourse,
this paper offers some reflections on the online contribution being made to feminist animal
rights and vegan discourse, and how digital media are shaping and influencing this
discourse and its wider impact. 
Introduction
Feminist discourses of animal rights, vegetarianism and veganism, much like feminist
discourse more broadly, have developed and mutated in an age of increasing use of the
Internet and information technology. Digital media platforms have, in fact, become both
locations and methods for the dissemination of information and channels of
communication and debate. However, what remains less clear is how digital platforms as
‘disembodied’ locations for animal rights discourse intersecting with feminist theory and
practice, impact the content and tone of the discourse itself. In particular, the question of
how we as feminists understand our relationships to our own bodies and corporeality and
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that of other animal species in an online context remains to be answered. 
(Eco)feminist Theory – the ‘Animal Question’ 
Slicer (1991) and Adams (1991) have discussed connections between the use of the non-
human animal as a resource and the ‘use’ of women within mirrored frameworks of
domination. Slicer examines animal testing and experimentation, while Adams focuses on
the non-human animal as ‘meat’. Establishing the non-human animal as subject and the
links between the language of patriarchy and patriarchal oppression of women and of the
non-human animal, both Adams and Slicer emphasize the role of dualisms such as
man/woman, emotion/rationalism, or nature/science, employed as constructs of the
justification of oppressions – that one element of the polarity is mightier on some basis,
and so has the right to oppress. 
Both Slicer and Adams critique the received notion of non-human animal inferiority as tied
to a lack of intellectualism or rationalism on the part of the animal. Both highlight the fact of
the perception of humans as being inherently superior to (and, therefore, inherently
entitled to oppress) non-human species. They expand on this phenomenon, linking it to the
same value judgements which also place the masculine (supposedly rational and
intellectual) ideologically above the feminine (supposedly irrational and emotional). In
essence, the contention of theorists like Adams and Slicer is that a feminism which
concedes that non-human animals are ‘less than’ humans simultaneously reifies the same
false logic that justifies misogyny, racism, homophobia etc. 
Gilligan (1982) discusses human responses to nature and the non-human animal, and
specifically how the ‘default’ human ‘gaze’ is codified as male, providing insidious
justification for the erasure of women’s experiences and standpoints. Collard and
Contrucci (1988) offer a similar critique of patriarchal scientific epistemologies, and Leland
(1983), Kheel (1995) and Jones (2011) have made significant contributions to discourse
around feminism’s actual and potential role in recalibrating the excessively patriarchal
language of both anti-woman and anti-animal practices, as well as of an animal rights
movement which is dominated by patriarchal ideologies, perpetuating them and neglecting
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intersectional approaches. The insistence upon patriarchal language and understanding
obfuscates and elides our perception of the non-human animal. It is this elision that leads
us to regard the non-human animal body as ‘meat’, devaluing empathy and normalizing
and ‘naturalizing’ our view of animals as edible, killable or sellable. 
This theoretical principle might invite us to consider what the online context means for
feminist debate, research and publication. Braidotti (2013) discusses the post-human
landscape as one where technology and internet-based ‘cyber’ contexts are increasingly a
part of the reality of what it is to be human. Braidotti argues that this is an opportunity to
move out of anthropocentrism, into a post-humanism where as humans we expand our
horizons of understanding of what it is to be embodied and organic. If we consider that to
be ‘meat’ is necessarily to be embodied, Braidotti’s analysis offers an interesting way into
understanding the human domination of and relationship to the non-human, particularly in
the future we are moving towards together. 
Adams refers to “a correlation between plant-based economies and women’s power and
animal-based economies and male power” (Adams, 2015:13), defining ‘the sexual politics
of meat’ as “an attitude and action that animalizes women and feminizes animals” (Adams,
2015:xviii). This demonstrates the way in which the consumption of the non-human animal
forms part of the same structure which enables the parallel consumption of women by
men. It also highlights the broader structure of domination under which both consumptions
are occurring – whoever is being consumed, it is the dominant male doing the consuming.
In (cyber) worlds where boundaries of being and of embodiment are blurred, the
emergence of a counter-culture which transgresses boundaries in this way will impact
upon all the many meanings of what it is to be embodied, to be a subject and not simply an
object, and what we understand as ‘meat’, in relation to the non-human animal and in
relation to women. However, in order to understand fully the impact of a technological
future, we need to consider who and what has or doesn’t have access to these means. 
Gruen’s (2015) theory of ‘entangled empathy’ highlights both the intrinsic humanity of
empathy and the oneness of humans with the rest of the natural world. Gruen focuses her
discussion on how we understand ourselves as individuals, our role in collective existence,
and how this impacts on our ability to empathize with other beings in accordance not
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necessarily with their similarity to us, but as other individuals. Curtin (1991:72) discusses
empathy and sympathy as part of a feminist ‘ethic of care’, and writes in particular in
relation to abstinence from meat as a “way of politicizing an ethic of care”. Donovan
(1996:165) frames sympathy theory as evolving in response to a feminist care ethic which
moves the ethical approach to non-human animals away from universalized, abstract
rationalism to an experiential empathy which can be applied to feminist praxis and lived
experience as well as theory. 
Plumwood (1993) focuses on how ‘mastery’ over nature through patriarchal rationalism
results in ethical frameworks which are incomplete and insufficient, and rendered
excessively theoretical and impersonal in the search for ‘universalizable’ theory. More
false dualisms laden with erroneous value judgements emerge when we critique
patriarchal, rationalist theories – the false dualisms of the universal/contextual, the
male/female, and the rational/emotional are all applied in devaluing women’s feminist
experiential approaches. These rationalist theories, of which Singer (1997) and Regan
(1983) are perhaps the most well-known and referenced in subsequent feminist responses
to their theories, frame the dominant patriarchal discourse as being separate from nature
and the non- human animal, rejecting a holistic understanding of humans within the natural
world, thus justifying domination. The role of (false) dualism is very pertinent, particularly in
considering how we conjure with a ‘real space’/digital media dualism, and what this real or
perceived polarity does to our appreciation of the role of digital communication in
understanding lived reality for species including, but not limited to, humans. A feminist
approach to animal rights rejects dualism as a justification for oppression in the same way
that it rejects dualism as the basis for masculine oppression of the feminine,
heteronormative oppression of the queer, white oppression of people of color and so on. 
Spiegel’s (1988) work correctly insists that feminists of color have a unique (and
historically erased) perspective, essential to the animal rights movement. In fact, Spiegel
maintains that the animal rights movement persistently reflects the mainstream elements
of white, wealthy and middle class normativity. Bahna-James, who has written specifically
on veganism as an animal rights and social justice issue, (2010:168) concurs by arguing
that “it’s important that Black women be included in the vegan dialogue, not only because
we are so frequently left out of it [...] the vegan cause will not be wholly effective until it
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addresses the diverse spectrum of circumstances and psychologies that contribute to the
practices it is trying to overcome”. 
Breeze-Harper (2010:20) writes about her personal journey to veganism, pushing past the
idea of animal rights and veganism as “the domain of the privileged” to an understanding
that oppression of the non-human animal contributes to the structure of privilege in society.
Mallory (2013) and Park (2011) show how animal rights theory and practice can be
focused on a more diverse racial and cultural relevance, reclaimed from perceptions of
white middle-class privilege which are a major obstacle to the mutual benefits of diverse
theory, but crucially of ensuring that praxis reflects this theory on a real experiential level
which resists superficial generalization and the temptations of abstract universalization.
Whether or not mainstream animal rights movements (or, more specifically, feminist
animal rights movements) are succeeding in engaging in truly intersectional theory and
praxis is a question which draws irresistibly upon where and by what means discourse is
occurring. While making reference to the established links between the oppressions of
women and of non-human animals, Deckha (2013:48) states “the majority of animal
advocates are women whose experience with animal advocacy is adversely inflected by
gendering”. In considering how women’s experiences of animal rights discourse are
gendered, we should also bear in mind that women’s use of online spaces is also
profoundly gendered and that this will inevitably impact upon the context and content of
feminist animal rights discourse online. 
It is also useful to consider ecofeminist and vegetarian-feminist analyses of language
when critiquing how language by and about the animal rights movement is used online.
Joan Dunayer has written about the link between animal insults and the degradation of
women, and it is my contention that this phenomenon takes on a new dimension when
viewed through the lens of online discourse. Dunayer lists animal-based pejoratives like
“bitch”, “dog”, “cow” etc, but points out that “without this disdainful view of dogs, dog would
not offend” Dunayer (1995:12). Our willingness to engage with this implied offensiveness
requires on our part the replication of an oppressive, anthropocentric dominance and
oppression, but what does this mean for speech online? A feminist discussion of
intersectionality in the animal rights movement often results in the movement being
reduced to and dismissed as a ‘policing’ of women’s bodies, which is necessarily and
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categorically ‘unfeminist’. However, ecofeminist theory can interrogate this as a
misappropriation or an expiation of guilt at a consumption which contributes to suffering
within a logic of domination, reinforcing the oppression of all oppressed groups. Gaard
(2002) and Warren (1990) contribute to the discourse around subjects such as queer
readings of the role and function of ecofeminist ethical approaches to the non-human
animal and nature and the intrinsic links between non-human animal oppression and the
intersectional foci of ‘traditional’ feminism. Online feminist spaces offer arena for the
interweaving of a variety of feminisms which challenge essentialist ideology and offer a
place to understand differing experience. An analysis of the animal rights movement in this
context will offer a deeper understanding of how ethical issues which contribute to ‘animal
rights’ – diet, ethical purchasing, environmental degradation – are lived by feminist
activists and commentators ‘beyond the theory’. 
Feminists and/in Digital Media 
Online platforms, and particularly social media and blog spaces, have made a
revolutionary contribution to feminist discourses. Keller (2016) offers an in-depth
assessment of blogging as a transformative form of discourse, particularly for young
feminists – “online spaces such as blogs have been significant spaces to problematize the
caricature of the feminist found within postfeminist popular culture” (Keller, 2016:19).
Existing research on feminist blogging appears to have this countering of traditional,
dominant (read ‘masculine’) discourse as its core focus. As such, much of the existing
research on feminism in digital media is focused on the concept of the creation of a
counter-culture or counter-public, which challenges the idea of what is socio-culturally
‘normal’ and what is considered ‘transgressive’. Fraser (1990:59) discusses the notion of
the public sphere and how this relates to what is public and private, and where the
boundaries of these concepts sit, when discussion happens online – in suggesting that
“discussants were to deliberate as peers” and “inequalities of status bracketed”, Fraser
lays the foundation for a consideration of what happens when the ‘public sphere’ of online
discourse is not open to all due to a lack of intersectionality and a failure to consider
inequality. It is also clear that there is no sphere for species beyond the human in this
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paradigm. 
Gay (2014:265) comments on social media (in this case, Twitter) maintaining that “social
networks [...] provide us with something of a flawed but necessary conscience”. This begs
the question of what the presence in digital media of social justice movements and
counter-cultures can actually do for discourse around the non-human animal. If we are to
regard the digital media counter-public as something of a disembodied ‘conscience’, we
must begin to try to reconcile that with feminist activism which rejects the policing of
women’s bodies and behaviors. Moreover, there is an opportunity here to interrogate the
function of digital media as a revolutionary conscience. We can ask whether (false)
anonymity is in fact part of the power source of this conscience, which provides the user
with the opportunity to engage in shaming practices which de-humanize (read, ‘make
animal’) and elide the individual. 
Some ecofeminist theory which asks questions about how the human co-exists with the
non-human makes stark and bold forays into questions of bodily being and ‘cyber-
existence’. As previously discussed, Braidotti (2013) has written on the impact of post-
humanist and post-anthropocentric thought on our sense of subjectivity, and Donna
Haraway in particular asks us to consider species and existence boundaries, the post-
human and transgression of bodily definitions, offering an examination of species and
subject boundaries. She describes her Cyborg Manifesto as being “an argument for
pleasure in the confusion of boundaries and for responsibility in their construction”
Haraway (1991:150). Echoing the rejection of false dualism, Haraway consistently
challenges what she regards as a false opposition of nature and culture – “nothing really
convincingly settles the separation of human and animal [...] movements for animal rights
are not irrational denials of human uniqueness; they are a clear-sighted recognition of
connection across the discredited breach of nature and culture” Haraway (1991:52). A
common method of discrediting animal rights discourse and activism, one can observe that
irrationality, emotion, sensitivity, empathy etc are often feminized, where rationality,
objectivity (even where objectivity in the absolute cannot possibly exist), detachment etc
are to be found in a scientific verbal ‘silo’ which is masculine by default and in which the
‘feminine’ must be resisted (if women are to be admitted at all). In short, accusations of
sentimentality are deployed as a method of silencing dissent over species-specific
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discourse. Haraway’s examination has enormous relevance to any study of how human
experience and bodily being exists in digital worlds where to be bodied and corporeal
takes on different meanings. 
Star (1996) encourages her reader to consider what our move into the digital means for
the concepts of home and homelessness. The discourse of animal ‘rights’ still struggles to
find a home in feminist discourse online in much the same way as it has and does in the
embodied praxis of feminism ‘in real life’. Zickmund highlights the “sense of Being-in-the-
world” which is often absent from cyber-community, which in turn informs our notions of
‘cyberhate’, particularly between subversive or counter-culture groups Zickmund
(2000:237). This again invokes the dehumanizations entailed in digital discourse and
‘being’ in digital media, and asks whether ‘cyberhate’ is generated in part by the
disconnection between the organic humanity and the abstracted cyber-presence. Plant
remarks that “We found ourselves working as slave components of systems whose scales
and complexities we could not comprehend. Were we their parasites? Were they ours?”
Plant (1998:4).
Kaitlynn Mendes’ Slutwalk: Feminism, Activism and Media references the 2011 worldwide
feminist phenomenon of the same name. Mendes dedicates a chapter to the ways in
which the global momentum of Slutwalk dovetailed with the ever-growing popularity of
social media, for all of its benefits and setbacks. In conclusion, Mendes lauds the
possibility for feminist networking offered by digital media, while also noting the lack of
safety and potential risks to mental health presented by cyberspatial discourse Mendes
(2015:185). Disagreement and debate on how ‘real’ feminism ought to respond to the
discursive move into online counter-publics is pertinent to the topic of online animal rights
and feminist activism, and in particular to our ability to grasp the heterogenous ways in
which feminists use and respond to digital technologies and what is arguably a tendency to
claim an equality in digital media which may not be as universal as some proponents
would suggest. Spender (1995) discusses how online discourse goes beyond a vehicle for
communication and is, in very real terms, a force for changing and shaping our
experiences, opinions and the way we engage interpersonally – if we are alert to what is
included, and what erased.
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Ebeen and Kramarae (1993) advocate for “criteria that demonstrate the extent to which
information technologies are deployed wisely” (1993:24). Digital media signal a (significant
but only partial) democratization of information, activism and knowledge, assisting in
proliferating feminist ethics, theory and philosophy out of academia. However, this
democratized, to some extent unpoliced space, comes with its own attendant challenges,
especially where, as is the case with non-human animal ‘rights’, the subject (the animal) is
by necessity excluded from the space itself, and present only as an object in humorous
YouTube videos, for example. It is vitally important to consider what digital media
circumnavigates and erases, as well as what it helps to lend a platform to, and to expose
to scrutiny the notion of digital media as an inherently safe and diverse space. 
The Voice(less) Online 
Sandoval (2000: 374) discusses the role that cyber spaces and the increasing co-
existence of “robotic conditions” and “human agency” play in “oppositional politics” and
“resistance”, particularly for those humans who are hierarchically disadvantaged in society
(including but not limited to women) and find themselves seeking to “renegotiate power” in
new ways. We can compare with this Spender’s (1995: 45) commentary on what digital
media means for our concept of the ‘reader’, and the fact that the advent of the printing
press challenged the reality that “only a very few people were readers: the priests and the
princes” and that “in modern times we expect everyone to be able to read”. If the
availability of information online has further democratized who can read what, we must
also consider this second point – that we assume (incorrectly) that this democratization is
complete because access to the skills and materials required to realize it is universal. With
this in mind, it is important to note that animal rights discourse happening online introduces
another layer of technological, cyber ‘agency’ (or lack of agency) into the discussions that
are taking place. As the developed world is a context in which human relationships with
animals-as-product are increasingly mechanized and robotic, so we as humans are also
using technologies to discuss the non-human animal ‘at a remove’. Sandoval (2000: 384)
also touches upon where and how cyber communication as a “methodology of the
oppressed” manifests as a “differential mode of consciousness, carrying it through to the
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level of the ‘real’ where it can guide and impress dominant powers”. In an Internet where
the non-human animal continues to be as voiceless as in ‘the real world’, the question of
whether animal rights discourse online succeeds in ‘impressing dominant powers’ perhaps
remains to be answered. The widening availability of digital media can, generally speaking,
be observed as having had a democratizing affect on feminist discourse in the developed
or ‘first’ world. Research, study and commentary from academic sources continues to
command authority and, arguably, to dominate the narrative. Internet resources may be
more readily accessible to more feminist activists and, crucially, individuals who may
identify neither as feminists nor as animal rights activists per se. 
Interestingly, Gromala (2000: 598) relates conversations with academics specializing in
VR (virtual reality) technologies and how they “thrill in the sensation of ‘disembodiment’
and the ecstasy of ‘leaving the meat behind’”. ‘Meat’ in this case refers to their own
physical reality, and as a choice of term it is very revealing, implying a sense that VR and,
perhaps, broader information technologies (and, by extension, the Internet) have the effect
of elevating the human to a divine state beyond the animal – beyond the ‘meat’. Gromala
(2000: 607) goes on to conclude that VR in particular “serves to upset notions in our
relationship to the symbolic realms, as well as binary mind/body, subject/object, and
material/immaterial distinctions” and that “what is at stake is our human ability to make our
world shareable with others”. What we must do here is to ask ourselves what we mean by
‘others’. If we mean simply the human ‘other’, this presumably means that our
technological future will remain as anthropocentric as our present. Given that the very
basis of the structure of oppression and the perceived right to dominate, both between
human groups and of humans over non-humans, is predicated on sets of binaries,
Gromala’s observation is pertinent. It asks us to consider what going ‘beyond the meat’ by
means of cyber technologies does to the binaries upon which societies in the developed
world are constructed, and also the form that the ‘voice’ takes in the context of that
transience and immateriality. 
Due in no small part to the power of online advertising (and, therefore, the influence of
mainstream media and capitalist purchasing power), a growing number of online spaces
are available to use for free provided an individual has Internet access - and this is a
contentious proviso when one considers how many people/women/feminists/animal rights
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activists lack easy or reliable Internet access. In summary, the democratization of
information, debate and expression has not extended to everyone, and despite the major
shift in the accessibility of ideas, there are large parts of the world and massive
populations which do not have access to these digital media. As such, in accordance with
feminist theory and practice, we need to consider the extent to which real life oppressive
structures are replicated when certain voices do not find a ‘home’ online. One of these
replicated structures is the oppression of the non-human. Star (2000) invokes the image of
the Ancient Roman goddess Vesta (Hestia in Ancient Greece) to illustrate the way in which
digital media problematizes concepts of home and homelessness. Crucially, Star (2000:
632-633) notes that the Vestal fire illustrates a non-anthropomorphized, perpetually
present (female) ‘entity’.  In considering that the concept of ‘hearth and home’ is mutable
and can, notionally, transcend principles of physical, geographic location, feminist theory
could therefore assert that the ‘world wide web’ reifies feminist principles of inclusion and a
‘home’ for all women. While material inequalities such as socio-economic and geo-political
barriers exist, truly inclusive online discourse is unlikely. Star (2000: 641) talks about her
‘homepage’ online as “a new addition to the way I think about myself and my sense of
home”, but also concedes that there are basic standards of financial security and
accessibility – access to hardware and software, literacy, a network of contacts – which
need to be met before the globally available, nebulous ‘home’ online can be set up and
inhabited. In fact, Star (2000: 640) explicitly states that there are cases where modern
technologies have served to elide the causes and impact of material, ‘real world’
homelessness – using as an example centers which provide voicemail boxes for homeless
job applicants which may help them to conceal their homeless status from potential
employers, but do little do interrogate or truly address the causes of their homelessness
‘root and branch’. As such, it is important to consider the structures of privilege which may
be being practiced online, and who and what is excluded from this form of discourse. 
As regards the rights of the non-human animal, digital media, while symbolizing something
like both the post and trans human, can also be seen to be entirely anthropocentric. It is a
complete exclusion of the ‘meat’ of the animal body – while humans live with animals in
‘real life’, the nature of the relationship with the animal shifts in cases where the animal is
completely absent (for example, when humans purchase and consume animals as ‘meat’,
the relationship with that meat as animal is elided and invisible). We can consider, for
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example, the comments of Haraway (1991, 2003) and Braidotti (2013) on the subjects of
blurred distinctions between the co-existences of humans and other animal species which
call into question the truth of the human/animal polarity, or how technologies of all kinds
are mutating our notions of what it is to be and live as human. In digital media, the non-
human animal is purely object and not subject (in basic terms, the non-human animal has
n o Internet access, and so is quite literally voiceless online), and is removed from the
interpersonal in a way which, to some degree, mirrors the way the invisibility of the non-
human animal is procured through the mechanisms Adams (2015) has discussed such as
the mass term and the absent referent, and the way that slaughterhouses and the
transformation of the animal into ‘meat’ is invisible and cloaked in euphemism. It is in this
context that online discourse, whether about feminism or animal rights or the intersection
of the two, takes place. There are ways in which feminist theories of animal rights and
veganism find (or fail to find) their ‘home’ online. The (im)materiality of digital media
influences both the content and context of the arguments being put forward, and frames
the subjectivity/objectivity of the non-human animal both as a material in ‘the real world’
and as a topic of discourse and debate.
Case Studies – Feminism Blogs the Animal 
In her 2016 blog post Confessions of a meat eating feminist1, Marija Assereckova’s
position is that veganism and feminism are not, and nor should they be, mutually inclusive.
On the question of the ‘rights’ of the non-human animal, Assereckova’s initial focus is to
challenge the equation of the reproductive rights of human women to the exploitation of
reproductive functions in the production of products like cows’ milk. Assereckova’s
argument seems to be that if as feminists we oppose the exploitation of a cow’s
reproductive system in a farming context, logically we must also oppose male animals’
acts of sexual ‘violence’ against female animals in the wild. However, though Assereckova
readily admits that “people do exploit animals”, this argument does not unpack the
distinction between farming (which is human-driven) and animal existences in the wild,
where species exist within a broader ecology. This is an interesting way in which human
1(http://www.europeanyoung.feminists.eu/2016/07/31/confessions-of-a-meat- eating-feminist)
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discourse online overlooks the way in which human agency is expressed through
technology, which includes mechanized farming and information technologies. The
conflation of animal suffering at human hands and inter-species predation in the ecological
wild overlooks the role that dominant masculine narratives of capitalism and
mechanization for maximum profit play in the mass production of meat and dairy,
particularly in the developed world. 
Further, Assereckova asserts that vegan-feminist arguments are too often predicated on
the anthropomorphization of non-human species. However, as many vegetarian and
vegan feminists and ecofeminist theorists have demonstrated, the ascribing of human
characteristics to non-human animals, far from being a necessary facet of the extension of
‘rights’ to non-human animals, can be regarded as being besides the point, and the rights
and utility based theoretical models including those of Singer (1997) and Regan (1983),
while still of relevance, have been rigorously challenged by vegan and vegetarian feminist
theory since their original publication. 
Assereckova asserts that feminist campaigning for animal welfare can only ever have
meaning inasmuch as it produces “moral satisfaction”, because animals cannot speak for
themselves and there cannot be a sense of “awareness that they are experiencing the
same oppression” as humans who campaign for their welfare or rights. However, it is
unclear how the fact that the non-human animal “has no voice” or is unable to verbalize a
shared oppression obstructs the value of feminist animal welfare advocacy. It is difficult to
reconcile the concept of voicelessness (which can be literal voicelessness as that
experienced by the non-verbal animal, or the metaphorical voicelessness of socio-
economic limitations, geo-political oppressions or a lack of social capital as experienced by
a large part of the human population) with an elision of our moral and ethical responsibility
to give voice to the voiceless where possible. As discussed earlier, to be voiced online
requires a certain amount of capital and a certain amount of agency, and the Internet does
not provide us with a mechanism by which all humans, much less all sentient animals, are
homed and given voice. Presumably, too, the logical conclusion of this position is that as
feminists we can only ever campaign from a position of shared experience, and while this
certainly seems to be a position held by many feminists, it also begs the question of how
we ‘should’ respond in the face of diverse experiences and difference. 
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In 2013 blog post Meat Eating and Feminism2, Nerdy Feminist, who similarly asserts that
while animal rights and welfare as they pertain to veganism as a lifestyle choice are not
incompatible with feminism, also openly states that “I will always choose humans over
animals . . . I value the bodily autonomy of people over animals”. This is unequivocal. It
would be interesting to read an explanation of this position which Nerdy Feminist asserts
‘as read’. However, as a lot of feminist theory shows, the ipso facto superiority of human
over non-human is not an ethical or philosophical ‘given’. This is interesting, too, when we
consider Gromala’s (2000) account of virtual reality experts and academics (who, it could
be argued, are the purveyors of the dominant narrative and culture) regarding VR
technologies as a means of transcending the ‘meat’ – the animal within the human. That
Nerdy Feminist is asserting the natural superiority of the human over the animal using a
medium which reinforces and reifies that ‘superiority’ is an important observation. 
In 2016 blog post I don’t eat meat because I’m a feminist,3 Madison Griffiths draws
comparisons between the objectification of women as the ‘property’ of men and the
objectification of animals as the ‘property’ of the human species, and goes on to describe
the concept of ‘othering’ which is at the root of these parallel oppressions – that difference
(in physicality, gender, sexuality, race, species) is a valid basis for oppressive practices
and that, in certain situations to be decided upon on an ad hoc basis, might can equal
right. If we consider feminist theory and discourse online as a counter-narrative to the
dominant, masculine, privileged narrative of the mainstream, we must also consider what
the elevation of the human above the animal through (information) technology means for
our oppressive relationships with the non-human animal. In short, we are faced with
feminist animal rights discourse which is taking place in a location which makes the
‘othering’ of the non-human animal easier.
Alice Rebekah Fraser’s 2016 online article Not eating meat makes you a Vegetarian, not a
Feminist4, is a response to Madison Griffiths, dismissing her position as a “desperate
conflation of philosophical ideas”. Fraser’s focus seems to sit more around what is
2 (http://www.nerdyfeminist.com/2013/01/meat-eating-and-feminism.html)
3 (http://www.smh.com.au/lifestyle/life-and-relationships/real-life/i-don’t-eat-meat-because-im-a-feminist-
20160830-gr4nmi.html) 
4 (http://www.sbs.com.au/comedy/article/2016/09/02/not-eating-meat-makes- you-vegetarian-not-feminist)
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perceived as a tendency on the part of veganism to police women’s bodies while
projecting ideological purity in a way which allows activists to grade themselves
comparatively, particularly in an online world. Fraser does not examine the question of
animal welfare and rights, and so it is difficult to interrogate the extent to which this
position allows that the consumption of the non-human animal by humans as a resource is
oppressive, and Fraser’s chief objection to Griffiths’ position is the conflation of masculine
digestive appetite with masculine sexual appetite.
In 2015 blog post 3 Reasons Black Folks Don’t Join the Animal Rights Movement – And
Why We Should5, Aph Ko focuses on intersectionality in animal rights and vegan activism,
and particularly on the prevalence in mainstream animal rights discourse of comparisons
between non-human animal exploitation and both historical and contemporary racist
ideologies and acts. Ko makes specific reference to ways in which that which is ‘animal’ is
also ‘other’, used to codify a basis or justification for mistreatment and exploitation, and
has been used as a structure for rationalizing the oppression of people of color. On the
question of animal welfare and the ‘rights’ of the non-human animal, Ko states “As black
people, if we fear being labeled an “animal” because it means that we can be used,
abused, objectified, and killed, then perhaps we should question why animals are
automatically deserving of abuse such that we’re terrified to even be called one”. Ko’s
reflections on this issue certainly echo feminist theorists including Joan Dunayer who have
interrogated the link between animal-related pejoratives and human oppressions, with
particular focus on the animalization of women. Moreover, Ko’s comments on the location
of non-human animal oppression within the broader structure of oppression are vital to a
full understanding of the incomplete nature of mainstream animal rights discourse – “no-
one’s liberation will occur within a context of injustice for another group of sentient beings
[...] the ease with which we look away from the suffering of sentient beings who are
regarded as “less than” is the same ease that white people use to look away from our
oppression”. 
Conclusion 
5 (http://everydayfeminism.com/2015/09/black-folks-animal-rights-mvmt/)
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In a world where the vast majority of animal life (both human and non-human) is not
connected to the Internet, and has no voice or agency online, we are invited to think more
carefully about who and what is included in online discourse and what is absent, and
especially about how we understand corporeality, anthropological identity and materiality
in a world where the mechanical, the technological and the trans/post human forms an
increasingly central part of our co-existences. Comparison and contrast with increasingly
mechanized, industrialized farming methods and the impact these have on human
relationships with animals-as-subjects vs animals-as-food could help us to understand how
ways of being with and discussing animals are affected by human technological
advancement. 
If we are to regard discourse and debate in digital media as an opportunity for
democratizing and improving the inclusion and accessibility of feminist theory and practice,
we must consider what this method of communication doesn’t do as well as what it does,
and who it excludes as well as who it empowers. This is not to suggest that online
discourse is not a viable means of empowerment, for women, for feminism and also for
animal rights discourse. In fact, increasing access to cheap or free publication platforms,
audiences and information means that digital media can be a location in which non-
mainstream media and counter-cultures can find a voice and also build networks.
However, when we talk about animal rights online, we are speaking f o r rather than
speaking t o o r with. This is also true when we speak about humans in the developing
world who are ‘homeless’ or even entirely absent on the internet, and this has ramifications
when the discourse invokes feminist theory or practice and discussion of privilege and
choice – as feminist critiques of the animal rights and vegan movements often do. 
The question of what digital media means for corporeality and physicality also provides a
lens for considering how we talk and think about bodies in the context of feminist discourse
and debate online. As a context for talking about what is meat, what is flesh, what is food
and how we conjure with body shape and image, it is profoundly ironic in its ability not just
to decentre the concept of ‘home’ but also of materiality and the fusion of the body and the
consciousness. 
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